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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, and H. ROGER 
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs . Case No. 14442 
E. KEITH LIGNELL and 
BURTON M. TODD, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The plaintiffs brought suit to recover from defendants 
a commission for broker1s services rendered by them under a 
listing agreement and an earnest money receipt and offer to 
purchase. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A judgment of no cause of action and a dismissal with 
prejudice was entered by the Trial Court against both plain-
tiffs. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants ask the Court to affirm the judgment 
of the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondents disagree, in part, with the facts as 
set forth by appellants. In addition, appellants have omitted 
many salient facts relied upon by the Trial Court and neces-
sary for this Court to understand fully the elements of this 
case. Plaintiffs view the important facts as follows: 
On August 18, 1972, the individual plaintiff, H. Roger 
Boyer ("Boyer") applied for an individual real estate broker's 
license with the Department of Business Regulation, Real 
Estate Division. That license was issued on December 14, 
1972, and during all times relevant thereafter H. Roger Boyer 
held, as an individual, a valid Utah Real Estate Broker's 
License (Finding No. 3, R. 194, Exhibit 8-P). The Boyer 
Company, a Utah Corporation, was incorporated on November 8, 
1972 (Finding No. 1, R. 193). It neither applied for nor held 
a Real Estate Broker's License at any time relevant to this 
suit (Finding No, 2, R. 193). In the latter part of September, 
1973, Boyer received a telephone call from Mr. Douglas Call-
ister ("CaHister") , his cousin, who was also the attorney 
for the Osmond Brothers, a singing group. Mr. Callister 
solicited the help of Boyer in locating property in Utah 
that would make a suitable investment for the Osmond Brothers. 
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Pursuant to this request, Boyer called Burton M. Todd ("Todd") 
shortly thereafter and inquired whether or not Todd would be 
willing to sell the Shaughnessey Apartments, a small apartment 
building located in Salt Lake City, Utah, owned by him and 
E. Keith Lignell ("Lignell"). Todd answered in the affirma-
tive, that they might be willing to make a sale upon the 
fulfillment of certain terms and conditions. 
During all times relevant to this matter Boyer was the 
agent for the Osmond Brothers and was acting for and on 
their behalf in the proposed purchase (Finding No, 3, R. 94, 
T. 138, Callister Depo. pp. 44-45). The Osmonds were, at 
this time, also looking at other properties with Mr. Boyer 
(T. 146, Callister Depo. p. 44). Mr. Lew Costley ("Costley"), 
the Osmond Brothers' accountant, and Callister met in Salt 
Lake City with Boyer to discuss the Shaughnessey Apartments 
and other potential real property investments on behalf of the 
Osmonds. One item discussed was the defendants1 need for 
money and its impact on the price the Osmonds would offer. 
Boyer indicated that he understood that the defendants1 were 
in need of money. At that time, Boyer apparently did not 
have a listing on the property but felt that he could obtain 
one from the defendants (Callister Depo. pp. 8-10). 
Thereafter, Boyer procured from Todd a listing agree-
ment authorizing him to procure a sale of the Shaughnessey 
Apartments for the sum of $915,000.00 (T. 14-15, Exhibit 1-P). 
The listing agreement set forth the following conditions: 
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1. That a condition precedent to the payment of any 
commission to H. Roger Boyer was the consummation of the 
transaction or the closing of the sale of the apartments and 
the actual receipt of the proceeds therefrom by the defendants 
(Exhibit 1-P, Finding No. 4f R. 194). 
2. Any sale of the property was subject to the app-
roval of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company ("North-
western") the holder of the permanent mortgage (Exhibit 1-P.) 
3. The dental building adjacent to the apartments, also 
owned by defendants, was specifically excluded from any sale 
(Exhibit 1-P, Finding No. 4, R. 194). 
On October 11, 1973, the corporate plaintiff, The 
Boyer Company, prepared and presented to defendants for their 
acceptance an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
wherein the Osmond Brothers, a Utah Partnership, purported to 
offer to purchase the subject apartments for the sum of 
$921,500.Q0. By its terms the said proposal was conditioned 
upon the buyers being able to assume, and assuming, the 
2 $512,000.00 mortgage bearing interest at seven percent then 
outstanding with Northwestern and sellers agreeing to lease-
back the property for three years. (Finding No. 7, R. 19 4). 
Approval of Northwestern was vital to sellers because 
the mortgage contained a "call" clause and absent approval, 
sellers would be obligated to pay a penalty of $35,000 (T. 84, 
MacLeod Depo. pp. 14, 15, 28) . 
2The prevailing interest rate at that time was around 
10% (T. 33, 215, MacLeod Depo. p. 23). 
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The document provided that any offer expired if not accepted 
in writing within one day, (Finding No. _•. Ls4 , and that 
any sale should close on or before October 18, 1973 (Exhibit 
1-P). In addition, the document contained the following 
provision: 
"It is understood and agreed that the terms 
written in this receipt constitute the entire pre-
liminary contract between the purchaser and the 
seller, and that no verbal statement made by anyone 
relative to this transaction shall be construed to 
be a part of this transaction unless incorporated 
in writing herein," (Exhibit 1-P). 
Two other provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement are 
significant. It provided that any agreement to pay a com-
mission was of no force or effect if there existed a presently 
effective listing agreement with any other agent (Finding No. 
15, R. 196) , and that if the offer was not accepted the 
return of the earnest money would cancel the offer without 
damage to the agent (The Boyer Company) (Finding No. 7, R. 
195). 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was 
delivered to Todd and Lignell by Boyer on October 11, 19 73. 
Upon receipt of the document defendants determined that cer-
tain provisions contained therein were unacceptable to them; 
however, because defendant Todd was going out of town the 
next day, he executed the document and placed his initials in 
the lower right hand corner above line 53 in anticipation of 
certain modifications that would be placed there by defendant 
Lignell (Finding No. 8, R. 195). On October 12, 1973, Lignell 
deleted lines 22, 23 and 24 of the said Earnest Money Receipt 
-5-
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and Offer to Purchase relating to the lease-back of property 
by the sellers, initialed the deletion, signed the document 
and delivered the same to plaintiff corporation. The corpor-
ate plaintiff then mailed the document to the Osmond Brothers 
in care of Costley at Ogden, Utah, where it was received on or 
about October 15, 1973. (Finding No. 9, R. 195). Thereafter, 
Boyer telephoned Callister and advised him of the changes to 
the Earnest Money Agreement made by Todd and Lignell. 
Upon receipt of the document, Costley placed it in 
his desk drawer; he did not sign it or do anything to indi-
cate his acceptance thereof on behalf of the Osmonds (T. 136). 
The acts of the defendants constituted a counter-offer, which 
counter-offer was never accepted by the proposed buyers, the 
Osmond Brothers. (Finding No. 11, R. 195). The defendants 
did not accept the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
and the offer expired by its own terms and ceased to have any 
legal force or effect (Finding No. 10, R. 195). 
Within a week to ten days after Costley received the 
amended document he telephoned Callister and discussed it 
with him. (T. 119). In that conversation the two decided 
that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter into the Earnest 
Money Agreement as modified (T. 118-121). On October 15, 
1973, Boyer telephoned Todd, advised Todd that the deletion 
could be worked out and requested that Todd telephone the 
insurance company (T. 21, Boyer Depo. p. 43, T. 83). That 
evening, Todd telephoned Theodore C. MacLeod ("MacLeod")
 f the 
Regional Manager of Northwestern at his home in Boulder, 
-6-
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Colorado, informed him of the proposed transaction, told him 
about the Osmonds and inquired concerning the possibility of 
having the Osmonds assume the existing mortgage at the 7% 
rate. Todd again called MacLeod at his office on October 17th 
and 18th concerning the proposed transaction (T. 81) . Todd 
was told by MacLeod that Northwestern would not permit the 
Osmonds to assume the loan absent an increase in the interest 
rate or some other modification (T. 27, 38, 157). Subsequent 
thereto, Todd had further telephone conversations with MacLeod 
throughout the month of October and into the month of November 
concerning the transaction (T. 81). Todd informed Boyer 
that the insurance company had refused his request to allow 
3 
the Osmond Brothers to assume the loan at the 7% rate (T. 50). 
On October 26, 19 73, Todd, Lignell, Boyer and Earl D. 
Tanner met for lunch and discussed, in the framework of MacLeod's 
refusal, a method by which the assumption of the Northwestern 
loan could be arranged. During that conversation, Boyer re-
quested that he be allowed to talk directly with Northwestern, 
which permission was granted by the defendants (T. 209). 
On October 30, 19 73, Boyer met with Costley and Call-
ister to discuss incentives that they might offer to North-
western in order to induce them to allow the Osmond Brothers 
to assume the mortgage. Some of the incentives discussed were 
the prepayment of interest and a slight increase in the interest 
%oyer, however, denied that Todd had ever told him the 
assumption had been refused but did acknowledge that he had 
that impression (T. 209) . 
-7-
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4 
rate. Although discussions were had, no specifics were agreed 
upon concerning what the Osmonds would or would not do in 
order to induce Northwestern to allow them to assume the loan 
(T. 138).5 
On November 2, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to deter-
mine the status of the proposed assumption. MacLeod told Boyer 
to have Todd give him a call (MacLeod Depo. p. 8). Boyer 
then telephoned Todd and asked Todd to write MacLeod a letter 
and send a copy to Boyer (T. 50). Since Todd had already made 
a number of telephone calls to MacLeod, he interpreted Boyerfs 
request to be an indication that Boyer did not believe that 
he had talked extensively with MacLeod; nevertheless, he 
agreed to write the letter (T. 50). 
On November 11, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to de-
termine whether MacLeod had received a phone call or a letter 
from Todd (T. 216). MacLeod told Boyer to contact Todd and 
discuss that matter with him. 
On November 16, 1973, five days after his telephone 
conversation with MacLeod, Boyer called Todd and inquired 
whether or not the defendants were going to sell. Todd inter-
preted this to be an ultimatum requiring a yes or no answer 
4While Boyer indicated that the Osmonds would consent 
to a 2% rate increase (Boyer Depo. p. 46), Callister had in 
mind nothing more than a 1/4 to 1/2 percent rate increase 
(Callister Depo. p. 25). 
5Boyer testified that at that meeting a prepayment of 
interest was considered and that they discussed what the 
Osmonds might be willing to do and under what conditions they 
might waive their right to insist on the 7% assumption (T. 
213). 
-8-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and faced with that ultimatum, stated that the defendants 
were not prepared to go forward at that time, whereupon Boyer 
requested that he be sent a letter setting forth that fact 
(T. 29, 163). Todd agreed to do so, prepared the letter on 
November 19, 1973, and sent it to Boyer (Exhibit 5-P). There-
after, on November 26, 1973, Boyer returned to Costley the 
$5,000 that had been deposited with him by the Osmonds. 
(Exhibits 14-D, 17-D). 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS ADOPTION OF THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. SUCH FINDINGS ARE ENTITLED 
TO GREAT WEIGHT. 
On the 29th of September, 1975, the Court rendered its 
Memorandum Decision, wherein it determined that the claims of 
plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice. Further, the 
Court requested that defendants1 counsel prepare the neces-
sary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 187-188). 
This defendants did and submitted them to the Court for its 
review along with a copy to plaintiffs1 counsel (R. 199). The 
proposed Findings of Fact were,signed by the Court on the 28th 
day of October, 19 75. Within the ten day period provided in 
Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P., plaintiffs filed a "Motion Objecting To 
and To Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", wherein 
most of the issues raised in this appeal were presented to the 
Court (R. 200-211) . Specifically, plaintiffs sought to attack 
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Finding No, 6, that defendants had exercised good faith, and 
Finding No. 17, that they were free to terminate the listing 
agreement — the same findings attacked herein. In their 
place plaintiffs proposed, among other things, a finding 
that defendants had exercised bad faith in their dealings 
with plaintiffs (R. 203, Proposed Finding 13(g)). Those pro-
posed amendments were rejected by the Trial Court after care-
ful deliberation and hearing argument of counsel. Having 
failed in a direct attack upon the Findings and Conclusions 
of the Court, plaintiffs now seek to attack them indirectly 
by arguing that these Findings and Conclusions should not be 
entitled to the presumption of validity that is generally 
accorded to findings and conclusions of the court. See Hardy 
v. Hendrickson, 27 Ut.2d 251,492p.2d 28 (1972); Lynch v. 
McDonald, 12 Ut.2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962). 
The preparation of the proposed findings and conclu-
sions by defendants is in accord with the long established 
custom of the Court. In reviewing this practice this Court 
stated in Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Co., 99 Ut. 32 3, 10 6 P.2d 
255 (1940): 
"The duty of making findings and conclusions 
is that of the trial court. In doing so it has 
become customary to have the prevailing party sub-
mit proposed findings and conclusions, and by rule 
of court the adverse party may submit objections 
and proposed amendments thereto—all of which was 
done in this case." 
The practice attacked by plaintiffs is not unique to this 
state but has been done with approval in many other juris-
dictions (See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, 513 P.2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1099 (Alaska/ 1973); Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins, Co. v. 
May, 434 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1967). 
As in the Merrill case/ plaintiffs submitted objec-
tions and proposed amendments to the Findings and Conclusions 
entered by the Court* After deliberation and argument the 
proposed findings of plaintiff were rejected and the proposed 
findings and conclusions prepared by defendants were reaffirmed. 
Thus, the Trial Court twice deliberated over the Findings and 
Conclusions that are being here attacked by appellant, there-
by, in respondents' view, not diminishing therefrom as plain-
tiffs suggest, but rather enhancing the weight that should be 
given to them. 
Plaintiffs attack certain of the findings upon the 
proposition that they are not specifically mentioned in the 
Court*s Memorandum Decision. The Court, however, clearly 
stated that its Memorandum Decision was not intended to be 
exhaustive nor to specifically detail each and every fact 
upon which it based its decision. The Court therein stated: 
"There are many more reasons the court 
could state for reaching the conclusions as set 
forth, including reference to the many cases 
cited by respective counsel." (R. 187). 
It is clear that there is no conflict between the 
Memorandum Decision prepared by the Court and the Findings and 
Conclusions ultimately entered by it. Even if there had been 
a conflict, however, under the law of this state, the formal 
findings must prevail. Park W Jamieson, 12 Ut.2d 141, 364 
P.2d 1 (1961) . 
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I 
It is the well established rule of this state that 
findings of fact and conclusions of law as entered by the 
trial court are granted a presumption of validity and unless 
clearly erroneous should not be overturned. Martin v. Martin, 
29 Ut.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973). Such presumption must 
attach to the Findings and Conclusions entered in this case. 
Point II 
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS NOT LICENSED AS A REAL ESTATE 
BROKER AS REQUIRED BY THE LAWS OF THIS STATE. 
Section 61-2-1, U.C.A. provides: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person, 
co-partnership, or corporation to engage in the 
business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or 
assume to act as a real estate broker or a real 
estate salesman within this state without first 
obtaining a license under the provisions of this 
chapter." (Emphasis added) 
An unlicensed broker is precluded by statute from maintaining 
an action to recover compensation for any act done or service 
rendered for which a license is required. Section 61-2-18, 
U.C.A. states: 
"No person, partnership, association, or 
corporation shall bring or maintain an action in 
any court in this state for the recovery of com-
mission, a fee, or compensation for any act done 
or service rendered, the doing or rendering of 
which is prohibited under the provisions of this 
act to other than licensed real estate brokers, 
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder 
as a real estate broker at the time of such act 
or the rendering of such' service»" (Emphasis 
added) 
Both the plaintiffs and defendants agree that if The 
Boyer Company was not licensed as a real estate broker during 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the time in question, the corporation cannot recover herein. 
This is in conformity with the law of this state relating to 
compensation for unlicensed activities. See Chase v. Morgan, 
9 Ut.2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959); Mosley v. Johnson, 22 Ut.2d 
348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969); Lyman W Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 362, 384 P.2d 
407 (1963); Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Ut. 521, 221 P.2d 849 (1949); 
Olson v. Reese, 114 Ut. 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948); Smith v. Amer-
ican Packing & Provision Co., 102 Ut. 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942). 
Plaintiffs herein attempt to fuzz the distinction 
between H. Roger Boyer, an individual, and The Boyer Company, 
a corporation. Since a corporation is a separate legal entity, 
however, that distinction must be kept clearly in mind. 1 
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.) 7, p. 37; 16-14-4, U.C.A. 
The undisputed facts clearly show that H. Roger Boyer, an 
individual, applied for an individual broker's license on 
August 18, 1972 (Exhibit 8-P). The application form set 
forth three categories of licenses that might be obtained — 
corporation, partnership or individual. Boyer, in his own 
handwriting, applied for an individual license (T. 219, Ex-
hibit 8-P). The subject license application further requested 
disclosure of the name and address of each member or officer 
if the applicant was a corporation; that portion of the lic-
ense application was left blank by Boyer. In addition, dif-
ferent affidavits were called for depending on whether the 
°Plaintiffs, on page 16 of their brief, state "It is 
undisputed that unless The Boyer Company was licensed as a real 
estate broker during October and November, 1973, The Boyer 
Company cannot maintain this action." 
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applicant was a partnership, an individual or a corporation. 
Boyer filled out the individual affidavit, but left the cor- ( 
poration affidavit blank. The testimony is uncontroverted 
that the license issued to Boyer was an individual broker's 
license (T. 220, 222, 277-279-)..7 
Subsequent to the date the license application was 
submitted by Boyer but prior to the time the license was 
8 issued, The Boyer Company was incorporated. Subsequent to 
that date, the individual license of Boyer was renewed by him 
on January 1, 1973 (T. 222, 278). On December 19, 1973, one 
month after the proposed sale had been terminated, the Depart-
ment of Business Regulation, Real Estate Division, received an 
application prepared by Boyer for the renewal of a real estate 
broker*s license wherein, for the first time, The Boyer Com-
pany was designated as a corporation and H. Roger Boyer was 
designated as an official of that corporation (T. 279, Ex-
hibit 8-P). Thus, it is evident that Boyer appreciated the 
distinction between The Boyer Company, a corporation, and 
himself as an individual, and knew that it was necessary to 
notify the Department of Business Regulation that it was the 
corporation that was now seeking to obtain a broker's license. 
In fact, Boyer testified that he was an employee of the 
Counsel for plaintiffs also recognized that the license 
as issued was an individual license to Mr. Boyer; as Mr. Rooker 
stated, "Now if I understand you then the broker license in 
this instance was issued to Mr. Boyer personally," (T. 268). 
^The Boyer Company was incorporated on November 8, 1972, 
some two and a half months after the licensing application 
was prepared. 
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corporation from which he merely drew a salary and that any 
real estate commissions that were earned were commissions 
earned by the corporation (T. 223). 
Although the testimony of Mr, Francis is confusing at 
best, he apparently was of the opinion that his department 
made no distinction between an individual and a corporation 
for licensing purposes, Mr, Francis testified, however, that 
he had only been the Department Director for a year and a half 
and had no idea whether his predecessor distinguished between 
individuals and corporations (T. 285), The documents produced, 
however, indicated that the Department did make a distinction 
in that it required different information and different pro-
cedures if the applicant were an individual or a corporation. 
Further evidence indicated that corporate applications were 
filled out differently than was the application of Boyer, and 
that the licenses issued to corporations contained different 
wording (Exhibits 8-P, 23-D and 24-D). Defendants submit 
that the evidence indicates that the Department clearly dis-
tinguished between licenses issued to individuals and cor-
porations, and had done so for a number of years. 
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the clear requirement of the 
law by taking refuge in what plaintiffs claim is a valid 
interpretation of the law by an administrative agency. De-
fendants submit that the testimony of Mr, Francis not to the 
contrary, the Real Estate Board clearly distinguished between 
individuals and corporations. Mr. Francis testified, how-
ever, that even he was not sure of his interpretation and 
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that he was concerned about it in view of the language of the 
statutes (T. 273, 272, 269).
 ( 
Even assuming that the interpretation of the statute 
by the Department was such as plaintiffs1 urge, plaintiffs 
can take no refuge therein. The clear law of the State i 
of Utah is to the effect that administrative interpretations 
are not controlling and are not binding upon the Courts, al-
though such interpretations will be given some weight when 
not out of harmony with the apparent intent of the statute. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Ut.2d 1Q2, 514 P.2d 
217 (19 73); State yy Hatch, 9 Ut.2d 288, 342 P.2d 1103 (1959). 
Even the Coleman case, upon which plaintiffs rely, recognizes 
that an administrative interpretation is of value only when 
uncertainty exists as to the interpretation of the statute 
and there is a rational basis for it in the provisions of the 
law. Even if these two tests are met, however, the admin-
istrative interpretation is not controlling. Coleman v. 
Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut.2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965). 
In that portion of its Memorandum Decision relating to 
the licensing statute, the Court stated: 
"However, the law is clear and unequivocal. 
And the court is of the opinion that the corpor-
ation is barred from recovering." (R. 187). 
Defendants submit, as the Court found, that the law on this 
matter is clear and unequivocal. The Legislature specifically 
provided that corporations must have a real estate broker's 
license and that if they fail to do so they may not maintain a 
suit for recovery of compensation based thereon. 
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That the Legislature contemplated issuing broker's 
licenses to corporations is further indicated by other pro-
visions of the applicable statutes. Section 61-2-2, U.C.A. 
includes within the definition of broker "all persons, part-
nerships , associations and corporations, foreign and domestic," 
who for a fee sellf rent, exchange, etc. real property. Sec-
tion 61-2-9(c), U.C.A. provides that: 
"Each real estate broker's license granted 
to any firm, partnership or association consisting 
of one or more persons, or to a corporation, shal1 
entitle such real estate broker to designate one of 
its officers or members, who upon compliance with 
the terms of this chapter shall, without the pay-
ment of any further fee, upon issuance of said 
broker"s license, be entitled to perform all of the 
acts of a real estate salesman contemplated by this 
chapter." (Emphasis added) 
As set forth in the above provision, any firm, part-
nership or association consisting of one or more persons, or 
a corporation, to whom a valid brokerfs license had been 
issued, can designate an individual within that firm, part-
nership, association or corporation, to function as a real 
estate salesman without the necessity of paying an additional 
fee. Of particular note is the limiting feature of the statute 
that provides that such privilege is only afforded to organ-
izations consisting of more than one person, or to corpor-
ations, it being for the obvious reason that an individual 
broker would be able to perform the functions of both a broker 
and a salesman. The statute, therefore, places the corporate 
broker on an equal basis with the individual broker in that 
it can both broker and sell property upon the payment of the 
same fee as is required of an individual. 
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If any doubt remained that the Legislature made a 
clear distinction between individuals and corporations for 
licensing purposes, that doubt is dispelled by the clear word-
ing of the penalty provisions for a violation of the licens-
ing requirements. 
Section 61-2-17, U.C.A. provides: 
"Any person violating a provision of this 
act, in addition to being subject to suspension 
or revocation of license, shall, upon conviction 
of a first violation thereof, if a person, be 
punished by a fine of not less than $100.00, nor 
more than $500.00, nor by imprisonment for a term 
not to exceed ninety days, or both; and if a cor-
pora t ion , be punished by a fine of not more than 
$1,000.00. Upon conviction of a second or subse-
quent violation, if a person, shall be punished 
by a fine of not less than $500.00, nor more than 
$1,000.00, or by imprisonment for a term not to 
exceed two years, or both; and if a corporation, 
be punished by a fine of not less than $2,000.00, 
nor more than $5,000.00. Any officer or agent 
of a corporation or any member or agent of a 
partnership or association, who shall personally 
participate in or be accessory to any violation 
of this act by such corporation, partnership or 
association, shall be subject to the penalties 
herein prescribed for individuals." (Emphasis 
added) 
It is interesting to note that the above statute pro-
vides that upon any violation by a person, such person is 
liable for a fine or imprisonment or both. If, however, the 
violation is by a corporation, said corporation is subject 
only to a fine. The corporate fine is, in all cases, greater 
than the fine provided for a violation by an individual. The 
Legislature clearly recognized that it would be impossible to 
imprison a corporation but not an individual, hence, the 
individual is subject to a fine and imprisonment while the 
-18-
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corporation is only subject to a large fine. 
It is also particularly interesting to note that any 
officer or agent of a corporation who participates in or is 
an accessory to the violation of the act is subject to the 
penalties provided for individuals, i.e., fine and imprison-
ment. 
Section 61-2-21, U.C.A. deals with the mechanics for 
revoking a previously issued license. That section by its 
specific language relates to persons, partnerships, or cor-
porations, yet another clear indication that the licensing 
requirements were intended to apply to corporations. 
Plaintiffs base their entire argument upon the prop-
osition that Section 61-2-6(a) requires the applicant for a 
broker's license to pass an examination, provide references, 
etc., and that thus it is impossible for a corporation to be 
an applicant. Defendants submit, however, that the testing 
of the corporation can be accomplished as provided in Section 
61-2-9(c), i.e., an official may be designated to represent 
9 
the corporation in that testing capacity. 
In view of the clear language of the statute, and the 
clear pronouncement of the Legislature that a corporation 
requires a broker's license, the administrative interpretation 
advocated by plaintiffs must fail as having no rational basis 
^Defendants submit that in many areas including contrac-
ting, engineering and architecture, it has logn been the practice 
of licensing agencies to issue licenses to corporations en-
gaged in those areas. See Section 58-23-10, U.C.A. 
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in the law. 
Defendants1 further submit that, notwithstanding the ^ 
contentions of plaintiffs, and the interpretation of the 
statutes urged by them, plaintiff corporation still cannot 
recover. As cited by plaintiffs, Mr. Francis testified that 
following the Division's approval of the association between a 
licensed individual and a brokerage corporation, both the 
corporation, in its name, and the associated individual may 
properly act as brokers (T. 279-82, 299). The evidence is 
clear that the corporation, The Boyer Company, did not apply 
for a license or request the approval of the Division until 
December 19, 1973, a month after the transaction had been 
terminated (Exhibit 8-P). Boyer testified that the corpor-
ation did not separately apply for a license until December of 
1973 (T. 222). Mr. Francis testified that the first time his 
Department had anything to do with The Boyer Company, a cor-
poration, was beginning January 1, 1974 (T. 279). Thus, even 
had plaintiff corporation thereafter become a licensed broker, 
a position that defendants feel is not supported by the clear 
law of this state, it could not have been licensed at the 
time the act or service was rendered; therefore, plaintiffs' 
claim of "substantial compliance" must fail. If the corpor-
ation was not licensed at the time the act or service was 
rendered, it is prohibited from maintaining an action in any 
court for the recovery of commission pursuant to the terms of 
§61-2-18, U.C.A. Even if it subsequently became licensed, the 
corporation's purported "substantial compliance" one month 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
after the transition was terminated, fails to satisfy the 
statutory requirement* 
Even had it been properly licensed, the corporation 
still cannot recover as will be discussed later since its sole 
claim for commission is based upon the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase, a document which was never accepted by 
the defendants and which, by its own terms, lapsed one day 
after it was proffered (Finding No. 10, R. 195). 
Point III 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY AMPLE 
EVIDENCE AND MUST BE SUSTAINED. 
On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to sustain the lower court. The findings are pre-
sumed to be valid and correct and will not be disturbed unless 
they are clearly contrary to the evidence, and the appellant 
must sustain the burden of showing error. Hardy v. Hendrickson, 
27 Ut.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (19 72) ; Carlton v. Hackett, 11 
Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961). Defendants submit that the 
findings of the Trial Court are adequately supported by the 
evidence and must be sustained by this Court on appeal. De-
fendants acknowledge that there were some areas where the 
testimony was in dispute, but a mere conflict of testimony is 
not sufficient to overturn the Court's findings. As this 
Court has stated: 
"The resolution of the dispute in this 
case is governed by that old and oft-repeated 
rule that where the evidence is in conflict, it 
is the trial court's prerogative to believe that 
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which it finds more convincing, and that its 
findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long 
as there is some substantial evidence to support 
them," McCarren v. TVlerrill, 15 Ut.2d 179, 389 { 
P.2d 732 (1964). 
Defendants submit that at best plaintiffs1 arguments 
show no more than a conflict in the testimony, in which case 
the Trial Court's findings should not be disturbed.10 There 
is, in the record, competent testimony supporting all of the 
Court1s factual findings. The Trial Court made its findings, 
which were adverse to the plaintiffs, after hearing testimony 
from the parties, which, testimony was at various times in 
dispute. The findings were reviewed again by the Trial Court 
upon plaintiffs1 motion and were again reaffirmed by it (R. 
215). This Court has frequently indicated that where com-
petent evidence supports the factfinder's conclusions, it 
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court, 
even if it disagrees with its findings. Pitcher v. Lorensen, 
18 Ut.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
A. Defendants acted in good faith in their dealings 
with plaintiffs and made reasonable efforts to consummate the 
sale. 
On October 15, 1973, Todd's first day back in the 
office after he had been out of town, Boyer telephoned him 
°An action for breach of contract is an action at law, 
rather than equity. Flynn v. Shocker Const. Co., 23 Ut.2d 140, 
459 P.2d 433 (1969). In an action of law, the appellate court 
does not reverse on issues of fact where the trial court's 
findings are supported by the evidence or the absence of it. 
Martin v. Martin, 29 Ut.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973). 
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and indicated to Todd that he (Todd) was to call MacLeod 
concerning the assumption of the mortgage by the Osmond Brot-
hers and further indicated to Todd that the matter of the 
deletion could be worked out (T. 21, 83, Boyer Depo. p. 43). 
Boyer testified that he told Todd that the contract was acc-
eptable to the Osmonds as amended. This fact was denied by 
Todd and, on disputed evidence, the Court concluded that the 
counter-offer was never accepted (R. 187). Costley testified 
that he first became aware of the deletion of the lease-back 
provision when he received an amended copy of the Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase in the mail, which docu-
ment was received by him on October 15, 1973 (T. 118, Finding 
No. 9, R. 195). Costley further testified that he telephoned 
Callister to discuss the deletion of the lease-back provision 
with him within a week to ten days thereafter (T. 119). 
Plaintiff states, in its brief that "in that conversation 
the two decided that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter 
into the Earnest Money Agreement as modified." Costley there-
after phoned Boyer and told him that the deletion was accept-
able (T. 121). Thus, there is evidence from plaintiffs1 
own witness that the decision to go ahead was not even made 
until at least a week after plaintiffs1 purported conversation. 
Defendants submit that there is ample evidence to corroborate 
the testimony of Dr. Todd concerning that disputed conver-
sation. Be that as it may, Dr. Todd immediately telephoned 
Appellantfs brief, page 6. 
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Mr. MacLeod at his home in Boulder, Colorado, to discuss the 
transaction with him (T. 27, 81, Exhibit 8-P) . Thereafter Todd 
telephoned MacLeod on the 17th and 18th of October and again 
on the 25th, 26th and 29th of that month. Todd testified that 
MacLeod told him unequivocally that Northwestern would not 
allow the Osmonds to assume the mortgage at the 7% rate (T. 27, 
38, 157). Todd then requested that MacLeod indicate to him 
what the insurance company would be willing to do. MacLeod 
indicated he would get with his board of directors and let 
Todd know, but he never did so (T. 28, 47-48). Todd felt, 
based upon his prior dealings with MacLeod that MacLeod's 
response was final and left no room for negotiation and that 
any further offers or proposals would have to come from 
MacLeod (T. 31, 38-39). Todd thereafter conveyed the refusal 
of MacLeod to Boyer (T. 5Q). 
During his conversations with MacLeod, MacLeod indi-
cated that he did not know who the Osmonds were, so Todd told 
him about them. Todd indicated that the Osmonds were sub-
stantial people, were good people to deal with and otherwise 
placed them in a most favorable light (T. 48, MacLeod Depo. 
pp. 26, 59, 6Q, 66). At no time did Todd tell MacLeod not to 
deal with the Osmonds or with their representative Boyer 
(MacLeod Depo. p. 46); in fact, Todd told MacLeod that they 
were allowing Boyer to call him directly (T. 28, 76). Thus, 
12Although MacLeod did not recall making that statement 
he testified that such a refusal would have been "quite possible 
if not probable" (MacLeod Depo. pp. 44-45) and part of his 
negotiating posture on behalf of Northwestern (MacLeod Depo. 
pp. 47, 59). 
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the conduct of Todd was hardly that of one attempting to 
block the sale as plaintiffs urge; rather, at all times his 
actions were to the contrary. 
On the 26th of October, Todd and Lignell, at their own 
expense, met with Boyer and also invited their attorney, Earl 
D. Tanner, to discuss the problems presented by MacLeod's 
refusal to allow the assumption and discuss alternative ways 
to accomplish their goal. At that meeting, Boyer requested 
permission to telephone MacLeod directly, which permission was 
freely granted by defendants (T. 209). Approximately four 
days after the meeting at the Ft. Douglas Club, Boyer par-
ticipated in meetings with Costley and Callister, discussing 
incentives that they would be willing to offer in order to 
induce Northwestern to allow the assumption of the mortgage by 
the Osmonds. Although many of these possible inducements 
were spelled out to Boyer, they were only communicated by him 
to Todd in a general way and Todd was not privy to the details 
thereof or to the determination as to which, if any, of the 
incentives the Osmond Brothers would actually be willing to 
give (T. 238) . Thus, Todd can hardly be criticized for fail-
ing to convey information he never received and upon which the 
proposed buyer's agents had not even agreed. 
The sole basis upon which plaintiffs predicate their 
contention that defendants exercised bad faith is the failure 
of Todd to write a letter, as requested by Boyer on the 2nd of 
November. Todd indicated he felt the request from Boyer was 
questioning his integrity and the representations that had 
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been made by him concerning his telephone calls to MacLeod 
and the discussions concerning the proposed transaction. 
Boyer indicated that he asked Todd to make a formal request, 
Todd denied that fact and inidicated that Boyer had merely 
asked him to write a letter (T. 50)• 
It is interesting to note that MacLeod, in his depo-
sition, indicated that in his first conversation with Boyer, 
he requested that Boyer have Todd give him a call (MacLeod 
Depo. p. 5). MacLeod did not at anytime tell Todd that a 
formal application from him relating to the proposed trans-
action was required (T. 253, MacLeod Depo, p. 47), nor did he 
tell Todd that he would not deal with the Osmonds without his 
(Todd's) okay (MacLeod Depo, p. 60), In fact, on an earlier 
occasion MacLeod freely dealt with outside parties without 
defendants1 prior knowledge and without their consent (T. 
253, Exhibits 6-P and 7-P). It is, therefore, pure conjec-
ture on the part of plaintiffs that Todd exercised bad faith 
in failing to write the letter, and such conjecture is directly 
contrary to the specific Finding No. 6 of the Trial Court (R. 
194) . 
Plaintiffs proposed deleting Finding No. 6 and sub-
stituting therefore their Finding No. 13(g) which provided 
that defendants had exercised bad faith in the transaction, 
the position they are urging on this appeal. That propos-
ition was rejected by the Trial Court. 
The actions of Todd in failing to write the letter 
have to be further viewed in light of the fact that he felt 
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he did not have a deal with the Osmonds (T. 156). The Court 
agreed and held that the counter-offer had not been accepted 
by plaintiffs (Finding No. 11, R. 195). There was, there-
fore, no requirement that Todd do more to complete the trans-
action. Defendants were free to terminate the listing agree-
ment at any time. The listing agreement entered into between 
defendants and H. Roger Boyer, the individual plaintiff, did 
not give him an exclusive listing of the property, contained 
no termination date, and provided that the commission would 
be paid only upon the consummation of the sale. Boyer test-
ified that all of his listing agreements were done by letter 
or other document similar to that executed by defendants, 
and that he did not use the standard listing agreement of the 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board (T. 217). Since Boyer was not 
given an exclusive listing for a set period of time, he cannot 
13 
complain. He was entitled to a commission only if a sale 
were actually consummated. No sale was consummated and de-
fendants did not prevent the plaintiff from performing his 
duties. Defendants were free to terminate their relationship 
with Boyer at any time. The termination was done fairly and 
in good faith by defendants on the 19th day of October, 1973, 
at the request of the individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer 
(Finding No. 17, R. 196) . See Wicks v. Moyle, 103 Ut. 554, 
137 P.2d 342 (1943). 
13 
x
^Boyer apparently reviewed the listing letter and 
found it to be acceptable to him (T. 63-65). 
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Plaintiffs attempt to inject two red herrings into 
their appeal — taxes and financing of other property. 
I 
Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that defendants1 actions were 
motivated by tax considerations. Todd indicated that while 
he was concerned about the recapture potential, as anyone 
would be, his analysis showed that there would be no prob-
lem. In spite of repeated questioning by plaintiffs' counsel 
attempting to prove otherwise, Todd steadfastly maintained 
that this was not one of the reasons the transaction was 
terminated (T. 160). Further, Todd testified that he could 
have taken a $200,000 tax gain without incurring any taxes 
because of his accumulated loss carry-overs (T. 163, 164). 
The contentions to the contrary noto being put forth by plain-
tiffs are wholly without merit. 
Plaintiffs, on what is at best disputed testimony, 
seek to have this Court believe that defendants financed 
other parcels of property thereby obviating the necessity of 
selling the subject building. While Boyer produced some 
notes of conversations with Todd purporting to estabalish that 
fact, Todd denied that such statements were ever made and 
further testified, without contradiction, that the alleged 
transactions would have been impossible (T. 247-259). " 
14Todd testified that at the time they were not even 
owners of the fee on one parcel and that on the other the 
lending documents precluded a sale. 
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B. Prospective Buyers Were Not Ready/ Willing and 
Able. 
Plaintiffs contend that, in spite of the fact that the 
listing agreement was a special listing agreement providing 
that the commission would be earned only upon the consummation 
of the sale, and that even though no sale was consummated, 
they are, nevertheless, entitled to receipt of a commission. 
In so doing, plaintiffs again attempt to blur the distinction 
between the individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer, and the 
corporation, The Boyer Company. The evidence was clear, and 
the Court found, that the claim of the individual plaintiff, 
H. Roger Boyer, could be sustained only upon the listing 
agreement (R. 186, Finding Nos. 4 and 5, R. 194). That 
agreement provided that before any commission was paid the 
sale must be consummated. It is undisputed that no sale was 
consummated. 
Plaintiff Boyer testified that he did not assign any of 
his rights in the listing agreement to the corporation and 
that all of the efforts relating to the Earnest Money Agree-
ment were done by the corporation (T. 223-224, Boyer Depo. pp. 
59-60, Finding No. 16, R. 196). 
The corporation's sole entitlement to a commission is 
based upon the language in the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase, wherein a commission in the sum of $28,500.00 
is recited to The Boyer Company. Since, however, that Ear-
nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was not accepted by 
sellers, that entire document, including any apparent 
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agreement to pay a broker's commission, must fail. In addition, 
since there existed a listing agreement with another broker at 
that time/ any agreement to pay a commission was, by the terms 
of the Earnest Money Agreement, "of no force or effect" (Ex-
hibit 1-P, Finding No. 15, R. 196). Further, by the terms 
of the document, a return of the earnest money cancelled the 
offer (Finding No. 7, R. 195). The money was returned on 
November 26, 1973 (Finding No. 14, R. 196). 
Plaintiffs seek, nevertheless, entitlement to a bro-
ker's commission based upon the claim that the purchasers 
were "ready, willing and able," a term that has great signif-
icance in a general listing agreement, but which has no sig-
nificance in this case in view of the special restrictions in 
the subject listing agreement. It is significant to note that 
plaintiffs proposed a finding to that effect but that it was 
refused by the Trial Court (T. 202). 
Regarding the ability of the Osmonds to assume the 
loan at 7%, Mr. MacLeod testified that it was the company 
policy to have Northwestern "participate" in the re-sale of 
the property where the interest rate is a factor (MacLeod 
Depo. pp.20-23, 52) and that any sale to the Osmonds would 
require adhering to the policy of improvement for Northwestern 
(MacLeod Depo. p. 27). MacLeod further testified that 
Northwestern could not consider approving the sale to the 
^ i n a previous assumption involving defendants, North-
western had required the new borrower to pay a higher interest 
rate (MacLeod Depo. pp. 20-21) . 
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Osmonds except on conditions consistent with its policy of 
effecting some improvement for itself (MacLeod Depo. p. 2 8). ° 
MacLeod acknowledged that he had no authority to guarantee 
that the company would have approved the assumption had he 
requested it. His authority was not to approve, but just to 
recommend (MacLeod Depo. p. 4Q). In fact, MacLeod acknowl-
edged that he could not even state that he would have recom-
mended the assumption without additional financial and other 
information (MacLeod Depo. p. 63), but stated that there was 
no guarantee that he would have recommended the assumption 
even if pressed. (MacLeod Depo. p. 70). Even had MacLeod 
recommended it to the home office, there is, of course, no 
assurrance that that recommendation would have been accepted. 
C. The Offer Was Impossible To Perform. 
Plaintiffs attempt to persuade this Court to ignore a 
major impediment to the consummation of the sale, to wit: 
the separation of the mortgage and property between the apart-
17 
ment complex and the dental building. There is no dispute 
that the listing agreement specifically indicated to plaintiff 
Boyer that the dental building was separate and apart from 
the transaction and would not be sold but, rather, had to be 
°MacLeod did state that he would have recommended the 
assumption had the requests persisted, however, it would have 
been a recommendation with great reluctance (MacLeod Depo. 
p. 41) . 
^•'Plaintiffs cavalierly brush this problem aside by 
classifying it as "minimal, if not non-existent." (Brief of 
appellants/plaintiffs, page 36). 
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separated out. While it is true that Todd indicated on many 
occasions that he felt that this would not be a problem., 
MacLeodf the person who had to make the recommendation, 
clearly and unequivocally stated that Northwestern would not 
consider a division of the property securing the loan (MacLeod 
Depo. pp. 28-31) . 
In response to questions from plaintiffs1 counsel, 
MacLeod testified as follows: 
"There was one other feature, and that was 
that we could not consider or would not consider 
a^  division of the property securing the loan so 
as to enable part of the loan being attributable 
to the apartment complex and part of the loan 
have a separate loan attributable to the medical 
office building; so that whereas a sale of the 
apartment might be taken to Osmonds, our loan 
would have to stand on a composite property on 
the entire property. We were not persuaded to 
partition the loan. It would leave us with too 
small a balance on the office building portion." 
(MacLeod Depo. p. 29, Emphasis added). 
Continuing en he stated: 
Q, That is, were there any concrete ideas as 
to how the partitioning of the property 
without the partitioning of the loan could 
be dealt with? 
A. Well, I think we just, off the top, kicked 
around how it might be effected within our 
disinclination to do it, as to who should 
receive the payment, as to whether they 
could leaseback, I suppose. Well, as you 
might judge, what would be the ways some-
thing like that could be handled. And I 
believe that's what we simply focused on 
conversationally for a few minutes. 
Q, I assume it was clear to both of you then 
that there were ways that it could be done 
without— 
-32-
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A. No, I would assume—I wouldn't make that 
assumption. I would say instead it 
appeared as though there would be perhaps 
difficulty in that. Well, simply perhaps 
difficulty in that. 
Q. And that was left to something— 
A. Our position was pretty well defined? we 
couldn't countenance a division of the loan. 
Q. Then I take it it was left that that would 
have to be worked out in some fashion between 
the Osmonds and Todd and Lignell so that 
it did not adversely affect Northwestern1s 
position. 
A. I would assume. 
. Mr. Bowen: Objection, leading. 
A. I don't know that I would accept it anyway. 
It wasn't a matter of adversely affecting 
Northwestern's position because Northwestern 
wouldn't let its position be changed so 
that it would be adverse or beneficial. This 
is something we were not willing to consider. 
We had a loan on the entire property and 
we were willing to consider an increase on 
that loan on terms consistent with current 
market, taking on Osmonds. But to go fur-
ther and have separate loans was not a 
matter we would consider at all/ (MacLeod 
Depo. pp. 29-31, Emphasis Added). 
Although the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase obligated the Osmond Brothers to assume the mortgage of 
$512,000.00, Todd testified that that was the total mortgage 
on both parcels of property and that 87% of that figure applied 
to the apartment complex and 13% to the dental building (T. 62). 
Mr. Costley testified that he knew the Osmond Brothers 
weren't purchasing the dental building (T. 145). Mr. Callister 
testified that the Osmond Brothers would not assume the mort-
gage on the dental building (Callister Depo. pp. 39-40). Two 
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i 
things, therefore, are readily apparent: 
(1) The Osmonds apparently had offered to assume the 
full mortgage on both parcels of property when in actual fact 
they had only intended to assume 87% of that mortgage. Hence, 
there was, at best, a mistake in their offer and no meeting 
of the minds between the offerors and the offerees. Absent a 
meeting of the minds, even if the offer had been accepted, 
there could be no contract. Wicks' v. Moyle, 10 3 Ut. 55 4, 13 7 
P.2d 342 (1943) . 
(2) The offer was impossible to perform. The doctors 
insisted that the dental building be split out, the Osmonds 
were only purchasing the apartment building and Northwestern 
would not separate the parcels of property. See Stewart v. 
Lesin, 5 Ut.2d 383, 302 P.2d 714 (1956). 
Although plaintiffs contend to the contrary, the evid-
ence is clear that although the Osmonds may have been anxious 
and probably financially able to purchase the property, they 
were not ready to do so — there were still too many details 
left to be finalized by them -- and they were not willing to 
do so upon the terms of the offer since they would not assume 
the full mortgage and they had not waived the 7% assumption 
requirement. In addition, they were not physically able to 
purchase the property since Northwestern would not divide 
the parcels. Even though the. test in this case is not a ready, 
willing and able purchaser but the actual consummation of the 
sale, the Osmond Brothers did not meet even the more liberal 
test advocated by plaintiffs. 
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Both Callister and Costley testified that at their 
meeting of October 30/ 1973, they discussed the possibility of 
providing some "incentives" to Northwestern to induce it to 
consent to the assumption. Both Costley and Callister, how-
ever, indicated that although they discussed what they might 
be willing to do, they did not finalize their discussions or 
come up with a concrete proposal or list of things that they 
would, in fact, be willing to do (T. 138, 213).18 Further 
there was never an agreement to waive the 7% requirement (T. 
133, 214). 
D. Plaintiffs' Authorities Are Inapplicable To The 
Facts Upon Which The Trial Court Ruled. 
The Trial Court found that the listing agreement in 
this matter was a special listing agreement, and that a con-
dition precedent to the payment of any commission to H. Roger 
Boyer was the consummation of the transaction and actual re-
ceipt of the proceeds by defendants (Finding No. 4, R. 194). 
Plaintiffs do not contest this finding, and indeed they cannot 
since the evidence is absolutely clear on this point (Exhibit 
1-P)• It is the clearly established law in this state that on 
a special listing agreement of this type, a broker is not 
entitled to a commission if the desired sale is not, in fact, 
18 
Callister testified that the Osmonds might be willing 
to increase the loan rate by 1/4 to 1/2 percent (Callister 
Depo. p. 25), while Boyer indicated that the Osmonds would be 
willing to increase it by 2% (Boyer Depo. p. 46). 
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consummated, even though a ready, willing and able purchaser 
is found. Wicks w Moyle, supra; Watson v. O'Dell, 58 Ut. 
276, 198 P. 772 (1921). 
Plaintiffs, however, seek to avoid the clear mandate of 
the law and place their hopes upon two cases, Hoyt v. Wasatch 
Homes and Curtis W Mortensen, the facts of which are both in-
apposite here. In Curtis v. Mortensen, the broker had pro-
cured from the potential seller a general listing agreement 
for a period of six months which provided that the broker 
would be entitled to his commission if he produced a ready, 
willing and able buyer, clearly not the situation here. 
Further, the broker procured an Earnest Money Agreement, signed 
by both the buyer and the seller. Subsequent thereto, the 
seller changed his mind and the Earnest Money Agreement was 
rescinded by the parties. The distinctions in the instant 
case are obvious. Here there was no acceptance of the Earnest 
Money Agreement but rather a counter-offer was prepared, which 
counter-offer was not accepted by the buyers (Finding Nos. 10 
and 11, R. 195) . Even had it been accepted, since the buyers 
at no time waived the requirement that they be allowed to assume 
the 7% mortgage or obtain equivalent financing (T. 138), plain-
tiff, at best, would have produced a one-sided non-contract. 
The defendants had no power to require the Osmonds to buy or to 
otherwise perform since the Osmonds at any time could back out 
of the transaction by claiming that the condition precedent to 
their purchase, the assumption of the 7% loan, could not be 
accomplished and would not be waived by them. This very 
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proposition was recognized in the Curtis case wherein the 
Court stated: 
"It is obvious that the reason this court 
has stated in the above cited cases that a binding 
agreement or offer of the buyer is necessary if a 
broker is to be entitled to his commission is to 
protect the seller from being obligated to pay a 
commission where the proposed buyer either cannot 
or will not perform and the seller is left without 
a remedy which he can enforce against the buyer." 
Curtis v. Mortenson, 1 Ut.2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954). 
Thus, even had the counter-offer of defendants been accepted, 
there would still not have been created a binding contract 
until the Osmonds either assumed the loan or waived that re-
quirement, neither of which occurred. 
While it is true that the Hoyt case concerned a special 
listing agreement and although no sale was consummated a 
broker's commission was awarded, the facts of that case are 
far different from the facts in the instant case. In Hoyt, 
the seller had executed a binding contract to sell with the 
potential buyer. The seller was "bought off" by the buyer and 
the agreement was rescinded; thereafter, the sellers arbi-
trarily refused to cooperate in the consummation of the sale. 
Further, the real estate broker was procured by the sellers 
and was acting as their agent, and the court there found 
that the buyers were, in fact, ready, willing and able to 
perform. 
In the instant case there was no binding agreement 
between the parties. Plaintiffs1 offer was not accepted; 
defendants' counter-offer was not accepted; therefore, there 
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could be no rescision of a binding agreement as was found in 
Hoyt. Further, as set forth above, the Osmonds were not ready { 
and willing to make the purchase upon the terms set forth in 
the respective offers• In fact, the purchase contemplated by 
the parties could not be consummated due to the impossibility < 
of separating out the dental building. It should be further 
pointed out that in the instant case, the broker was the agent 
for the buyers, not the sellers, and that his involvement in 
the transaction was on behalf of his cousin's clients and 
the Shaughnessey Apartment was only one of many other parcels 
of property being investigated by plaintiff for the Osmonds 
at that time (T. 146, Callister Depo. p. 44). 
In addition, there was neither a refusal to cooperate 
or a deliberate obstruction of the sale by defendants as was 
found in Hoyt. In Hoyt, the Court specifically did not deal 
with the question of whether or not a special listing agree-
ment and the earnest money receipt could stand independently 
of one another, or whether the restricting feature in the 
special listing agreement, although not spelled out in the 
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, was nevertheless, 
a condition precedent to the recovery of a commission. 
When faced with a similar question, the Supreme Court 
of Washington, in Harding v. Rock, 60 Wash. 2d 348, 363 P.2d 
784 (1962) held that where the listing agreement provided for 
a broker's commission payable at the closing of a sale, and 
where the purchase agreement contained a different provision, 
-38-
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providing an unconditional promise to pay a commission, the 
limiting provision of the listing agreement, must be read in 
conjunction with the purchase agreement, and, hence, entitle-
ment to a commission would accrue only upon the consummation of 
the sale. In the instant case, plaintiffs recognized that the 
limiting provision of the listing agreement was intended 
to carry through to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase. In fact, plaintiffs1 counsel so stipulated during 
the trial of the cause (T. 44), and Todd so testified without 
contradiction (T. 43). 
Since the plaintiffs agree that the payment of a com-
mission under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
was not unconditional but was limited to the actual consum-
mation of a sale, they should not now be heard to claim a 
commission absent a sale. 
Further, this is not a case where the sellers procured 
a broker who worked diligently for them, produced a buyer upon 
the terms set forth by seller and obtained a fully executed 
agreement to purchase and then was cut off and left high and 
dry by his sellers who went behind his back and sold the 
property. In fact, Boyer stated that he didn't care who paid 
the commission, the Osmonds or the defendants (Boyer Depo. p. 
23). It just happened that a commission provision was included 
in the Earnest Money Agreement. The testimony further indi-
cated that the property was not even sold until 13 months 
later and then at a price far less than that contemplated in 
the Osmond Brothers transaction (T. 26). 
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Point TV 
NEITHER THE EARNEST MONEY OFFER NOR DEFENDANTS f COUNTER-
OFFER WERE EVER ACCEPTED 
Plaintiffs apparently contend that the Court erred in 
its finding that the counter-offer was never accepted by the 
buyers (Finding No. 11, R. 19 5) and claim that that finding in 
reality implies acceptance. 
Todd stated that the purported oral acceptance of Boyer 
was never communicated to him (T. 51-52). The Court accepted 
the testimony of Todd on this point (Finding No. 11, R. 19 5; 
Memorandum Decision <j[ 3, R. 187). That testimony is amply sup-
ported by the testimony of Costley, as has been previously 
pointed out. It is undisputed that there was no written acc-
eptance of the counter-offer by anyone (Finding No. 12, R. 
195) . 
Plaintiffs misapprehend what is involved here. Although 
plaintiffs contend that Callister and Costley thought they had 
a deal, the mere mental acceptance of an offer by an agent 
cannot give rise to a legally binding contract. Both Call-
ister and Costley stated unequivocally that they did not com-
municate an acceptance of the counter-offer to defendants,, 
neither did they accept the counter-offer in writing or auth-
orize anyone else to do it on their behalf (T. 136, Callister 
Depo. p. 42). That they may have communicated their acceptance 
to Boyer, their agent, and formed in his mind a conclusion 
that the counter-offer was acceptable is still insufficient to 
-40 
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create a legally binding contract. Based on these premises, 
the Court's finding that there was no acceptance of the counter 
offer in a legally binding fashion is sound. 
Even if the Court had believed Boyer that the conver-
sation of October 15th was as he claimed that too would have 
been insufficient to constitute an acceptance in a legally 
binding fashion for the following reasons: (1) the purported 
acceptance occurred more than one day after the counter-offer 
was made, (2) the purported acceptance was not in writing. 
See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971); 
and, (3) there is no evidence that Boyer as a sub-agent had 
authority to accept the counter-offer on behalf of the Osmonds. 
As a matter of fact, defendants contend the evidence clearly 
shows he had no such authority. Boyer journeyed to Ogden with 
the Earnest Money Agreement and obtained Costley's signature 
thereon on behalf of the Osmonds; further he knew he had to 
obtain the approval by Costley and Callister of the counter-
offer. Absent that authority Boyer could accept the counter-
offer in any fashion. See Equitable Realty Inc. v. Nielson, 
30 Ut.2d 433, 519 P.2d 243 (1974); Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 
Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971). 
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Point V 
LACK OF AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT PRECLUDES RECOVERY 
BY PLAINTIFFS UNDER ANY THEORY. 
Plaintiffs only raise objections to two of the Court's 
findings—No. 6 and No. 17. Therefore, the remaining unchal-
lenged findings must be accepted by this Court. The Trial 
Court found that the defendants did not accept the proffered 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, and that it 
expired by its own terms one day later and ceased to have any 
legal force or effect (Finding No. 10', R. 19 5) . The Court 
further found that the acts of defendants constituted a counter-
offer and that the counter-offer was never accepted by the 
proposed buyers, the Osmond Brothers (Finding No. 11, R. 195). 
See Lynn v. K. C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Ut.2d 3, 425 P.2d 4Q3 
(1967). 
Boyer acknowledged that the Earnest Money Agreement was 
not accepted by the defendants (T. 238). In his telephone 
conversation with Mr. Callister, he indicated that the Earnest 
Money Agreement been had been changed (T. 183, Callister Depo. 
p. 20). There can be no doubt that since defendants did not 
agree to all of the provisions of the offer there was no 
binding contract. R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Ut. 
194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952). Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Ut.2d 83, 368 
P.2d 597 (1962). 
The corporate plaintiff's claim for entitlement to com-
pensation is based exclusively upon the recitation in the 
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Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase. There can be no 
claim by the corporation under the listing agreement since 
that agreement was made with the individual plaintiff, H. 
Roger Boyer (Finding No. 4, R. 194) , and none of the rights 
of that listing agreement were ever transferred to the cor-
porate plaintiff (T. 224, Boyer Depo. pp. 59-60). The cor-
poration's sole claim for compensation, therefore, is based 
upon a proposed contract that was never accepted and never 
became binding upon any of the parties thereto. Since there 
never was a contract, the language contained in that document 
upon which the corporate plaintiff relies is of no force or 
effect. This is true even if plaintiff corporation were 
properly licensed, and even if the facts were as plaintiffs 
contend; there is still no basis for the award of the requested 
commission. As this Court has stated: 
"Since defendants were not bound by the 
earnest money agreement, they were not as a matter 
of law, liable to pay the commission." Frandsen 
v. Gerstner, 26 Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971). 
The individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer's sole claim 
to compensation is based upon the special listing agreement 
between him and defendants. (Exhibit P-l, Memorandum Decision 
fll, R. 186. That a'greement stated specifically that before 
any commission was paid the sale must be consummated. The 
evidence clearly showed that all efforts to consummate a sale 
of the property were done by the corporate plaintiff (T. 224, 
Boyer Depo. pp. 59-60) , including the preparation of the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Finding No. 7, R. 
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194) . The Earnest Money Receipt does not provide for the 
payment of any commission to the individual, H. Roger Boyer. 
Rather, that document identifies the broker in three separate 
places as "The Boyer Company" (Exhibit 2-P, lines 1, 44 and 
58). 1 9 
Point VI 
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS MATTER WAS NOT 
OF THE TYPE THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO COMPENSATION. 
The conduct of the plaintiffs in the instant case is 
far different from that in the cases relied upon by them. 
Both Boyer and The Boyer Company were acting as the agents for 
the buyers. Boyer had participated in numerous meetings with 
the buyers regarding this and other transactions. Boyer was 
concerned with the Osmonds and not with the welfare of defen-
dents. In fact, he freely discussed the buyer's ability to 
reduce the purchase price based on defendants1 need for money. 
His only contact with the defendants, however, was by random 
telephone calls. On only one occasion did he have a meeting 
to discuss the transaction and that was at the request of 
defendants and at their expense at the University Club (T. 
87) . 
The Earnest Money Agreement that was ultimately pre-
pared was at variance with the listing agreement and as such 
19Had the Earnest Money Agreement been accepted, any 
commission due thereunder would, by its terms, have been pay-
able only to The Boyer Company. 
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cannot give rise to a claim for compensation. See Lynn v. 
K.C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Ut. 2d 3, 425 P.2d 4Q3 (1967). Although 
the Earnest Money Agreement provided that the buyers were to 
assume the mortgage at 7% it did not require the consent 
to the transaction by Northwestern. Consent to the trans-
action was important to the sellers inasmuch as the failure of 
the insurance company to consent would obligate the sellers 
to pay a $35,000.00 penalty payment (T. 45 and 84, MacLeod 
Depo. p. 28). Boyer was aware of this prepayment penalty 
but did nothing about it. (T. 214) . The earnest money in 
this case was delivered by the Osmonds to their agent, there-
fore, at no time was there any consideration passed binding 
the transaction. While it is true, as plaintiffs contend, 
that in many cases earnest money is not exchanged directly 
between the parties to a transaction but goes to one's agent, 
that situation is usually applicable where the real estate 
broker is representing the sellers. In those cases there is a 
transfer of consideration from the buyers to the sellers when 
the money is deposited with the seller's agent. In the in-
stant case the money was transferred from the buyer to the 
buyers agent. There was no transfer of any type to the seller 
or seller's agent; therefore, there was no consideration ex-
20 
changed in the transaction. u 
The testimony is clear that H. Roger Boyer did little, 
if anything, to bring about the consummation of the sale. He 
20 WA situation roughly analogous to the one presented 
here was mentioned by the Court in Equitable Realty, Inc. v. 
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left it to the doctors to work out all arrangements with the 
insurance company. Although he did telephone MacLeod on one 
occasion in an attempt to facilitate the transaction, this 
call was six days after he had been given permission to do so. 
He made no proposals to MacLeod or to Todd and gave no direc-
tions to Todd in his dealings with MacLeod. He made no offer 
of assistance to Todd in attempting to facilitate the trans-
action. In short, he sat back and let Todd attempt to earn 
his commission for him, secure in the knowledge that if the 
deal went through he would get his commission, and if it 
didn't go through he would sue. When it became apparent that 
the deal was not going to go through/ he induced defendants to 
send him a letter terminating the transaction, but failed to 
advise them he was contemplating a suit for his commission 
even though he had been thinking about it for many days (T. 
210-211). 
After the sale was scuttled, the property remained on 
the market for another 13 months. It was ultimately sold by 
the doctors for less money than they had been offered in the 
Osmond transaction. The evidence is clear that Boyer himself 
failed to work diligently to bring about the sale of the 
property and therefore should not be entitled to a commission. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings entered by the Court are based upon clear 
and competent evidence and therefore must be sustained by this 
Court on appeal. The plaintiffs, having lost at trial, and 
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having lost on their motion to amend the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now seek on this appeal to raise the same 
precise issues that they twice raised in the Trial Court and 
twice lost. The attempt by plaintiffs to go behind the Find-
ings and Conclusions other than to determine whether they are 
supported by the evidence, if sustained, would open up a Pan-
dora's box, would allow a losing litigant to have three or 
four bites from the apple causing great confusion both at the 
trial and appellate level and would destroy the clear rules of 
appellate practice which have been long established in this 
state. This is particularly so in the instant case where the 
Court on two occasions, reflected upon the findings objected 
to by plaintiffs and found them to be in accordance with its 
ruling. 
The statutes in this state are clear. A corporation 
must be licensed as a broker or it cannot sue to recover a 
real estate commission. In spite of the contentions of plain-
tiffs to the contrary the construction given to those statutes 
by the Real Estate Division recognized a distinction between 
an individual and a corporate broker. But even if they did 
not, such interpretations must give way to the clear man-
date of the Legislature. 
The plaintiff corporation made no attempt to become 
licensed or to otherwise qualify with the real estate division 
until approximately one month after the instant transaction 
failed; therefore, even if the statutory interpretation urged 
by plaintiffs were correct, plaintiff corporation cannot 
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recover. Its failure to timely apply for a real estate bro-
ker's license is fatal to its cause. 
The evidence indicates that Todd worked diligently to 
bring about the consummation of the sale while plaintiffs, 
agents for the buyers, did little if anything. The findings 
of the Court that defendants exercised good faith and did not 
refuse to cooperate or otherwise block the sale are supported 
by ample and clear evidence and must be sustained on appeal. 
Further, the buyers procured by plaintiffs were not ready, 
willing and able to perform under the terms of the Earnest 
Money Agreement, as amended and the Court implicitly so found. 
The transaction, as contemplated was impossible to perform and 
the conditions placed in the agreement by the prospective 
purchasers had not been waived by them. 
The overriding consideration, however, is that the 
corporate plaintiff's sole entitlement to compensation is 
based upon an Earnest Money Agreement that was never accepted 
by either one of the parties. A non-existent agreement cannot 
give rise to a valid obligation to pay based thereon. The 
individual plaintiff did not fulfill the terms of the listing 
agreement since no sale was consummated and he is precluded 
from recovery. 
The judgment of the lower Court was entered after care-
fully considering the evidence, observing the demeanor of the 
witnesses and reviewing the exhibits. Its determination was 
again reviewed after extensive argument by counsel in relation 
to plaintiffs objection to the Findings and Conclusions. It 
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is in the province of the Trial Court to resolve areas of 
conflicting testimony and to render its judgment in accordance 
with the facts as determined. This careful consideration by 
the Trial Court should not be overturned on appeal. The 
judgment of the lower Court must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES 
Earl D. Tanner 
J. Thomas Bowen 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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